It looks like James deleted my comment so I will post it here:
I am guessing this is Shannon,
“Anyway so the mode of God’s knowledge precludes our saying that God knows propositions.”
>>>So on shannon’s theology, the mode of knowledge eliminates an object of knowledge.
“According to the doctrine of divine aseity (DDA) God is absolutely self-existent, self-contained, and self-sufficient. God does not depend in any way on anything external to himself or distinct from himself. ”
>>>Which is exactly why if one holds to the doctrine of the one triune God he by definition cannot believe in eternal generation.
“In that case, why can’t we say that it’s also acceptable to speak about God’s thoughts, so long as we understand that ultimately each of God’s thoughts is identical to God?”
>>>What kind of identity? Cardinally numeric substantial [cns] identity? Then only one proposition, but wait, propositions require subject and object- well trash that idea.
So then each thought is a mode of a single CNS? But wait, aren’t the divine persons modes of the CNS? So for every idea, you have a divine person? No? So then only one thought? That’s not omniscience and I would pay good money to see how you are going to develop an archetype-ectypal epistemic theory off of one nebulous archetype. No wonder Plotinus was consistent enough to deny thinking to his monad altogether and hypostatized the nous out of the One. Maybe you should just drop the whole Neoplatonic bag altogether.
“If the champion of DDS can accommodate a meaningful distinction between God’s omniscience and God’s omnipotence, there’s no reason to think he can’t also accommodate a meaningful distinction between God’s thought that he is omniscient and God’s thought that he is omnipotent.”
>>>But what if the former fails altogether? You are left empty-handed with a tu quoque of a non-existent theory.
“My only point here is that if the notion of divine attributes can be reconciled with DDS, there’s good reason to think that the notion of divine thoughts can also be reconciled with it.”
>>>But that begs the question, where has it been proved that dds can be reconciled with divine attributes?
Aquinas’ Summa Theologica First Part, Question 3. The simplicity of God, articles 3 and 4, is saying that there is something imperfect, something deficient about the proposition in man’s mind that keeps him from univocal knowledge of God: COMPOSITION. Distinction is in itself imperfect. Therefore, composite man must have a created representation (ectypal knowledge) of that which is uncreated and simple (archetypal). Who else said that the distinction between subject and predicate within a proposition was in itself imperfect? Plotinus! In an exposition of Plotinus’ One Dr. Clark says,
“These Ideas, however, this Divine Mind, is still not the highest principle of all. For in this realm duality remains. Since the Ideas are distinct from each other, there is multiplicity. In knowledge there is always a subject and a predicate, a knower and an object known, and hence duality. But duality is secondary to unity. Therefore it still remains to climb the steep ascent of heaven to the source, the One.”
If it is the case James that you predicate propositions in God’s mind you are admitting to the exact composition that we Clarkians use to affirm univocal knowledge of God. Dr. Clark,
“Thomas developed the theory of analogy far beyond the simple observation of Aristotle, and it took on major proportions when the subject was God. Thomas held that the simplicity of the divine being required God’s existence to be identical with his essence. This is not the case with a book or pencil. That a book is and what a book is are two different matters. But with God existence and essence are identical. For this reason an adjective predicated of God and the same adjective predicated of man are not univocal in meaning. One may say, God is good, and one may say, This man is good; but the predicate has two different meanings. There is no term, not a single one, that can be predicated univocally of God and of anything else.” Three Types of Religious Philosophy by Gordon Clark (The Trinity Foundation: Jefferson, Maryland, 1989), pg. 63
“As far as I can see, the scenario I’ve just sketched is entirely consistent with Theistic Conceptual Realism.”
>>>But is that consistent with analogy of proportionality? I deny it.
“This was of thinking has historically been denied in Christianity, since to know by way of propositions is to know by way of a process of reasoning.”
>>>That is simply asserting a denial of the distinction between a logical and a chronological series with no proof.
“Certainly God doesn’t know things in the manner that we know them — that’s a given.”
>>And I hope you understand we Clarkians do not deny this. God thinks eternally and intuitively we temporally and discursively, but that only speaks to the manner of God’s knowing NOT THE OBJECT OF GOD’S KNOWING.
“God knows perfectly, immediately, intuitively, exhaustively, and simply. But we cannot deny that in some meaningful sense God has thoughts and those thoughts have propositional content. Otherwise we fall into the pit of pure apophaticism. We must reject univocity, certainly, but we must also reject pure equivocity.”
>>To rely on what theory of analogy James? There are a few and just so you know Clarkians do not deny analogical knowledge of God. It is only a certain type of analogy, like proportionality. Analogies of proportion still have elements of univocity in them. Analogies of proportionality do not.
“We finite knowers break up God’s undivided intuition into separate ideas.”
>>>And that is why this view espoused the analogy of proportionality, i.e. archetypal/ectypal knowledge. The view you hold to James while denying its basis.